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INTRODUCTION: RECONSTRUCTING LIBERALISM
CYNTHIA V. WARD*

However bruised by the continuous attacks of its radical critics, "liberal legalism" has so far survived the critical onslaught.
But like all battles between powerful opponents the fight has
produced casualties on both sides. Liberal theorists have responded to radical attacks by re-examining certain facile assumptions about the priority of individual autonomy, the nature
of rationality, and the possibility of state neutrality, and replacing them with a rich and provocative literature that affirmatively defends liberal values and celebrates liberal legal institutions
as the best-perhaps the only-way of respecting and encouraging human "difference" while also maximizing freedom and
equality.
On the other side, the work of radical critics of liberalism has
begun to reflect the idea that liberal values-appropriately modified-are worth examining in a reconstructive light. Without
losing sight of the injustices that have been inflicted on vulnerable groups under the liberal American Constitution, at least
some radical theorists seem willing to concede that something
precious, perhaps even irreplaceable, would be lost were liberal
rights and institutions, with their vision of respect for individual
dignity and their desire to maximize individual freedom, to be
rejected wholesale along with the scourges of racism and sexism
that have always shadowed them.
It is tempting to oversimplify. One should take seriously the
declared motivations and concerns of one's opponents, and be
careful not to discover casually that they have been on one's side
all along, although somehow without realizing it. Let me therefore emphasize that I think there are important and irreconcilable differences, at many levels, between liberal visions of the
person, of politics, and of the law, and the visions articulated by
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liberalism's communitarian, critical race, feminist, and postmodern critics. What I find most fascinating in recent legal theory, though, is the increasingly apparent intuition that amid such
basic differences there is also a growing area of common ground.
Ironically, it may be that the reconstruction of liberal legalism,
in some recognizable form, will become the single most dramatic
result of radical legal theory.
Of course the whole project of reconstructing liberalism raises
as many questions as it does answers. Suppose, for example,
that under a redeemed liberalism, individual autonomy-albeit
in reconstructed form-becomes the shared human faculty that
both unites our strivings for the good and makes them possible.
Does it follow that the law should protect the exercise of individual will, creativity, and imagination? If the answer to that is
yes, to what extent, and in what forms should such protections
be designed? Should liberal law continue to take as its core function the protection of certain fundamental individual rightssuch as the freedoms protected under the so-called "right to privacy"? Should law protect these autonomy-enhancing rights at
the cost of weakening strong group affiliations, such as those
maintained in civil associations that may themselves be grounded in anti-liberal, anti-agentic principles? Or should reconstructed liberals seek other ways (and what might those be?) to recognize agency while also taking notice of the special disadvantages
that society has imposed on groups such as racial minorities and
white women?
Finally, is the whole effort to revive autonomy misconceived?
The protection of autonomy has been envisioned as the reason
for limiting legal and political interference in the lives of individuals, but is autonomy, even reconstructed autonomy, an adequate tool to achieve this task? In the realm of the criminal law,
for example, does it really make sense-as so many liberals have
averred-to organize legal requirements and prohibitions around
the protection of individual autonomy, either the autonomy of
the criminal or of her potential victims? Or ought liberals to be
forced to argue the substantive morality or immorality of particular criminal prohibitions without the protection of an autonomy
principle that, in the abstract and from the outset, bans the
criminal law from operating in spheres deemed central to indi-
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vidual choice? In the end, is liberalism most effectively conceived
and defended as a form of politics that gives pride of place to
diversity rather than to individual autonomy?
We assembled a distinguished group of philosophers and legal
scholars to suggest answers to some of these questions. In the
essays and comments that follow, our symposium participants
investigate the continuing value of the bedrock liberal principles
of privacy, autonomy, toleration, and neutrality, acknowledging
the force of various critiques of liberalism while striving to retain, within the rules governing our legal and political institutions, an identifiably liberal respect for individual freedom, dignity, and personhood.

